Suchergebnisse

This Element aims to connect the literature of street-level bureaucrats with that of policy entrepreneurship in order to analyze why and how bureaucrats operating at the street level can promote policy change in public administration at the individual level. I demonstrate how street-level bureaucrats act as policy entrepreneurs in different contexts around the globe to promote policy change and analyze what they think of policy entrepreneurship and what they do about it in practice. For this purpose, I use multiple research methods: a survey, in-depth interviews, focus groups and textual analyses. I also offer recommendations to decision-makers to promote street-level policy entrepreneurship, highlighting the benefits of doing so. Lastly, I critically discuss the normative aspects of street-level policy entrepreneurship: ultimately, is it desirable?

How do public administration reforms develop in cases of political instability? Administrative reform has always been on the agenda of governments. Ample literature discusses its necessity and the factors that are associated with both its successes and failures worldwide. Nevertheless, only a few studies discuss the impact of political instability on public administration reform. Focusing on the Israeli experience, we explore public administration reform in the context of political instability. Using content analysis and in-depth interviews, we highlight how political instability adds more costs to politicians' cost-benefit calculations about actively promoting public administration reform, as well as how it blocks their desire to engage in mundane work when large, visible reforms have been proposed. Our findings indicate that the problems of non-governability and political instability that create the need for administrative reform also create powerful barriers to it—particularly the lack of political will.

This article presents the findings of an exploratory study examining the relationships between street-level bureaucrats' (SLBs) trust in their peers, managers, and the institution they belong to, and their willingness to endanger their own lives for the public. We build on previous administrative and behavioral theories to present a model of these relationships. Using a survey of 211 police officers in Israel, our findings demonstrate the important role of trust in understanding the willingness of civil servants to risk their lives for citizens. We also identify additional factors that may be related to their willingness to take this risk and the types of clients for whom they are less or more willing to do so. We discuss the normative elements related to these findings and suggest fruitful future directions for study.

What is the role of culture in street-level bureaucrats' bending the rules and accepting informal payments for health care? The literature on street-level bureaucrats stresses the importance of both individual and organizational factors in understanding how they use their discretion but usually neglects the importance of the culture in determining how far they are willing to go in exercising this discretion. Using data from 102 in-depth interviews with doctors and nurses in Israel, and by linking the literature about street-level bureaucrats to that of the research on informal payments for health care, we demonstrate that the culture plays a key role in decisions about accepting such payments. According to our findings, such payments are a phenomenon rooted in the culture and range from the extreme case of bribery to the fuzzier area of making exceptions for favored and sympathetic clients.

SummarySince the 1980s, New Public Management (NPM) and post‐NPM reforms have dominated attempts to improve public administration. The literature suggests several reasons for the latter approach. However, these explanations seem to be less relevant to the ongoing civil service reforms in Israel. The Israeli experience is an example where NPM reforms did not occur, but post‐NPM reforms were adopted enthusiastically decades later. Our findings demonstrate how under the structural conditions of both non‐governability and bureaucratic centralization, post‐NPM reforms may provide an attractive layering strategy, offering the option of changing certain features of the system without requiring a drastic, comprehensive overhaul of it. Once Israeli decision makers decided that there was a real public demand for reform, and long‐term learning and diffusion processes convinced them that change was needed, the characteristics of the post‐NPM approach made it much easier politically for them to adopt. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Dans le présent article, nous analysons, sous l'angle de la théorie des jeux, l'interaction entre les politiciens et les bureaucrates israéliens en ce qui concerne le processus budgétaire national depuis les années 80. Dans les années 70 et 80, les nouvelles conditions structurelles ont donné naissance à de nouvelles règles formelles et informelles, qui ont affaibli la position de négociation des politiciens par rapport au ministère des Finances (MF). Le Plan israélien de stabilisation économique de 1985 modifiait non seulement les institutions politiques, mais créait aussi de nouvelles institutions informelles. Dans ces nouvelles circonstances, les politiciens israéliens n'ont que rarement la possibilité d'aller à l'encontre du MF dans le processus de négociation politique. Étant donné que les agents du MF sont sensibles aux processus internes israéliens et à l'opinion publique nationale, les politiciens israéliens ont peu de chances de donner l'impression qu'ils sont disposés à aller à l'encontre des agents du MF. Nous allons voir que cette situation peut entraîner au final un équilibre imparfait pour le bien-être collectif en Israël étant donné que l'équilibre des pouvoirs entre les acteurs privilégie le côté qui domine – les agents du MF. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Dans le présent article, nous examinons l'évolution du changement institutionnel et de différentes stratégies politiques formelles et informelles dans le processus décisionnel budgétaire. À partir du moment où les conditions structurelles ont donné naissance à de nouvelles règles formelles et informelles, qui affaiblissaient la position de négociation des politiciens par rapport au ministère des Finances, les politiciens ont commencé à avoir beaucoup de mal à aller à l'encontre des agents du ministère des Finances. Cela peut se traduire par l'apparition d'un décalage considérable entre l'opinion publique et la politique socioéconomique dans la pratique. Pour éviter de tels scénarios, la solution consiste à s'assurer, au moyen d'institutions solides, que l'équilibre des pouvoirs entre les acteurs ne risque pas de privilégier l'un des deux côtés.

This article suggests a game theory analysis of the interaction between Israeli politicians and bureaucrats regarding the national budget process since the 1980s. During the 1970s and 1980s new structural conditions created new formal and informal rules that weakened Israeli politicians' bargaining position vis-à-vis the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The 1985 Israeli Economic Stabilization Plan not only changed the formal political institutions, but also created new informal institutions. Under the new circumstances, Israeli politicians can rarely challenge the MOF in the political bargaining process. Given that the MOF officials are aware of Israel's internal processes and public opinion, attempts by Israeli politicians to create the impression that they are willing to challenge the MOF officials are unlikely. We demonstrate that this situation may ultimately lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium for Israel's social welfare because the balance of power between the players favors one dominant side – the MOF officials.Points for practitionersThis article provides insights into how institutional change and various formal and informal political strategies are played out in budgetary decision-making. When structural conditions create new formal and informal rules that weaken politicians' bargaining position vis-à-vis the Ministry of Finance, politicians may find it very hard to challenge the Ministry of Finance officials. The results may include the creation of a significant gap between public opinion and the socioeconomic policy in practice. The key for preventing such scenarios is making sure, via strong institutions, that the balance of power between the players will not favor one dominant side.